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Sending Juveniles to the California
Youth Authority: The Need for
Effective Procedural Safeguards
The Youth Authority Act of 19411 created the California Youth
Authority (CYA) and established the tenet that the state would
substitute training and treatment for retributive punishment in order
to rehabilitate youthful offenders. 2 This Act codified the concept that
young offenders need and should be given help instead of punishment. 3
Although the rehabilitative purpose remains a meritorious objective,
growing reason exists to believe the original language of the Act is
not consistent with the punitive nature of the CYA today.' Over the
years, the wards' housed by the CYA have undergone continuous
change. 6 During the early history of the CYA, status offenders comprised a substantial portion of the institutionalized population. 7 "Status
offenders," defined as juveniles whose offenses would not be considered misdemeanors or felonies in the adult system, were excluded
from the CYA in 1975.8 As a result of this exclusion, the average
age and criminal sophistication of those committed to the CYA after
1975 increased substantially.9 Approximately forty-two percent of the
juveniles presently in the CYA have been committed for crimes of
violence, 10 a proportion three times greater than in the mid-1960s. 11
The CYA is the largest juvenile detention system in the nation. 12 The
1. 1941 Cal. Stat. c. 937, at 2522 (adding CAL. vErF. & INsT. CODE §§1700-1783) (amended
by 1943 Cal. Stat. c. 690, at 2442).
2. West, The California Youth Authority: Planningfor a Better Tomorrow, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 607, 607-08 (1979).
3. Id. at 608.
4. Id.
5. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §602. Any person under the age of 18 years who violates
the law is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and may be adjudged a ward of the
court. Id.
6. West, supra note 2, at 608.
7. Id. at 615.
8. Id. at 615-16. Status offenders were excluded by departmental policy in 1975. This
policy became law when section 207 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code subsequently was enacted. Section 207 was amended in 1978 to allow brief detention of status offenders in certain circumstances. Id.
9.

See id. at 615.

10.

1983 ANNUAL REPORT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA YoUTH Am ADULT CORRECTIONAL AGENcY;
DEPART ENT OF Tm YoUTH AUTHoRrrY 10 [hereinafter cited as 1983 ANNUAL REPORT].
11.
12.

West, supra note 2, at 615.
1983 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 4.
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most serious juvenile offenders in the state, as well as young adult
offenders committed to the CYA by the adult criminal court, are
housed together.13 In short, the CYA bears little resemblance to the
caring rehabilitative institution envisioned by the promulgators of the
Youth Authority Act of 1941.
California statutory law allows a judge to commit a juvenile to
the CYA if the judge is fully satisfied that the juvenile will benefit
from the treatment provided by the CYA. 14 In keeping with the basic
purpose of the Youth Authority Act, the judge is given complete discretion to choose a disposition that the judge believes will be for the
welfare of the child.'I The judge is not restrained by any set procedure
other than the need to sign the dispositional order. 6 Clearly the courts
have not given up the original ideals of the juvenile justice system.' 7
Equally clear is the fact that while the CYA is labeled a rehabilitative
treatment center in accordance with the Youth Authority Act of 1941,
the institution in reality is more closely analogous to an adult prison. 8
When an adult is sentenced to prison, the judge is required to write
a statement of reasons supporting the sentence.'" A juvenile committed
to the CYA suffers equally serious consequences and, therefore, should
be entitled to the same due process protections.
This author will demonstrate that commitment of a juvenile to the
CYA is analogous to a transfer from a rehabilitative noncriminal
system to a punitive criminal system and that a decision to commit
a juvenile to the punitive atmosphere of the CYA is sufficiently critical
to compel the assurance of due process safeguards."0 Recognition of
juvenile constitutional rights depends upon the presence of a "critical"
proceeding,' the requirements of which will be used as a framework
to analyze the nature of a disposition to the CYA. 22 The author will
conclude that the California Supreme Court should implement a procedure requiring juvenile court judges to articulate a statement of reasons
supporting a disposition to the CYA to protect the constitutional rights
of juveniles. The first undertaking necessary to support this conclusion is the analysis of United States Supreme Court decisions that
initially recognized juvenile constitutional rights.
13.

Id. at 4-5.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §734.
15. Id. §726.
16. See In re John H., 21 Cal. 3d 18, 26, 577 P.2d 177, 181, 145 Cal. Rptr. 357, 361 (1978).
17. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 119-37 and accompanying text.
19. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170(c).
20. See infra notes 107-48 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 23-93 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 10748 and accompanying text.

14.
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U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS APPLIED TO JUVENILES

From the inception of the juvenile court system in the United States,
the procedural rights afforded juveniles have differed markedly from
those afforded adults." A juvenile is not entitled to bail, indictment
by grand jury, public trial, or trial by jury.24 The rationale for this
inequity is that the juvenile court is engaged in determining the needs
of the child rather than adjudicating criminal conduct.2 5
26
In 1899, the Illinois Legislature passed the first Juvenile Court Act.
Today, every state has enacted similar legislation." The Illinois Act
established the first juvenile court and operated under the doctrine
of parens patriae.21 Juvenile court proceedings were deemed civil in
nature and stressed rehabilitation over punishment. 29 Since these proceedings were nonadversarial, normal procedural protections were
deemed superfluous.3" Instead of procedural protection, the informal
proceedings were to provide careful, compassionate, and individualized
treatment. 3 Proponents of parens patriae asserted that the benefits
unique to the system included the following: (1) juveniles were not
classified as criminals; (2) juveniles were protected from public
disclosure of their deviant behavior; and (3) informal proceedings were
32
to provide guidance, help, and advice to facilitate rehabilitation.
Although the informal proceedings did not provide the same constitutional protections afforded criminally accused adults, the unique noncriminal nature of the juvenile system was cited repeatedly as a
33
justification for this result.
The first indication that juvenile proceedings conducted in accordance
with the parens patriae doctrine inadequately protected the due pro23.
24.
25.
26.

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967).
Id.
Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).
Alster, Juvenile Offenders: Is Society Better Served by Punishing Them or Protecting

Them, Vol. 8, No. 2, Summer 1979, Hum. RTs. 42, 44.
27. Id.
28. Id. Pursuant to the parens patriae doctrine, the state is viewed as the guardian of
individuals who are legally disabled. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979). In effect,
the concept refers to the duty of the state to "protect the young [and] helpless." D. BFSHMAov,
JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVOCACY, PRACTICE IN A UNIQUE COURT 2 n.5 (1974).
29. Alster, supra note 26, at 44.
30. Id.
31. See 387 U.S. at 15-16.
32. Id. at 22-24.
33. People v. Silverstein, 121 Cal. App. 140, 142-43, 262 P.2d 656, 657 (1953). A juvenile

was committed to the CYA for 15 months, released and convicted in superior court for the
same charge. Id. The defendant was denied protection against double jeopardy because the
juvenile proceeding was held not to be a criminal adjudication. Id.; In re Dargo, 81 Cal. App.
2d 205, 209, 183 P.2d 282, 284 (1947). A minor was denied protection against self-incrimination
because a juvenile proceeding was held not to be a criminal adjudication. Id.
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cess rights of children occurred in 1966 when the United States Supreme
Court decided Kent v. United States.34 The Court in Kent recognized
that lack of due process safeguards for juveniles often led to procedural arbitrariness. 35 Kent extended due process protections to proceedings that allow the juvenile court to waive jurisdiction over a child
and order the case tried in adult criminal court.3 6 The Kent decision
addressed the procedural rights of a child being transferred out of
the juvenile system." Subsequent Supreme Court holdings, however,
do not extend due process protections only to those juveniles removed
from the juvenile system. In 1967, the Court extended due process
procedural rights to an action totally within the juvenile system. 3 a The
Court in In re Gault39 recognized that the fourteenth amendment and
the Bill of Rights apply to protect a minor during the adjudication 40
phase of juvenile proceedings., 1 Gault held that the risk of incarcerating
a juvenile in a state institution was sufficiently critical to compel constitutional protection. 2
Parens patriae was the doctrine originally used for all juvenile
proceedings.43 Kent and Gault, however, recognized the danger in a
system that contained no procedural safeguards and, consequently,
were the first cases in which constitutional protections were applied
to juveniles. Despite the decisions in Kent and Gault, courts are reluc4
tant to abolish the broad discretionary standard of parens patriae.'
To understand how procedural due process safeguards can be extended
to juveniles who presently are not afforded this protection, the reasoning behind the Kent and Gault decisions must be explored.
A.

Kent v. United States

The facts underlying Kent v. United States involved a sixteen year
old boy who had been arrested on charges of house breaking, robbery,
34. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).

35. Id.at 555.
36. Id. at 560-61.
37. Id.

38.

See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).

39. Id.
40. An adjudication is entry of a decree by a court in respect to the parties in a case.
BLACK'S LAW DICTiONARY 39 (5th ed. 1979). In a criminal procedure, the disposition is the
sentencing or other final settlement of a criminal case. Id. at 423. The distinction between
these phases in the juvenile process is important to this author's analysis of the procedural
issues surrounding a disposition order.
41. 387 U.S. at 13.
42. Id.
43. See Alster, supra note 26, at 44.

44. See id. at 53.
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and rape."5 Under the District of Columbia Juvenile Court Act, Kent
was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the District of Columbia
juvenile court.16 Statutory law also provided that the juvenile court,
after a "full investigation," could decide to waive jurisdiction and
transfer the juvenile for trial in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia. 7 Kent opposed waiver of jurisdiction by
the juvenile court and petitioned for a hearing on the issue." The
juvenile court judge denied the hearing and entered the order of waiver
with the recitation that the order was made after a full investigation. 9
Kent subsequently was tried by the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia, found guilty, and sentenced to prison."
He appealed this conviction on the ground that the waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile court constituted a denial of due process of law."
After the appeals court affirmed the conviction, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to evaluate the impact that the parens
patriae doctrine had upon the protection of the constitutional rights
of children. 2 The Court expressed concern that the child within the
juvenile system receives neither the protections afforded adults nor
the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children.5 3
That concern, however, did not induce the Court to rule that constitutional guarantees applicable to adults charged with serious criminal
offenses must be applied to juvenile court proceedings when juveniles
are charged with similar violations. 4 Instead, the Court focused upon
the important statutory right of Kent to be tried in the noncriminal
juvenile system. 5 Waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile court was
found to have been "critically important" since the consequence of
that waiver was to deprive Kent of his right to noncriminal juvenile
6
treatment.
The Court in Kent held that there must be a hearing before a juvenile
court may waive jurisdiction. 7 The Court also declared that an order
of waiver must be accompanied by a statement of reasons explaining
why the decision to waive was made.5" The statement need not in45. Kent, 383 U.S. at 543-44.
46. Id. at 543.

47. Id.
48. Id.at 545.
49. Id. at 546.

50. Id.at 548-50.
51. See id.at 552.
52. Id. at 552-55.

53. Id.at 556.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 556-57.
56. Id.

57. Id.at 560.
58.

Id. at 561.
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clude conventional findings of fact but should be sufficient to demonstrate that the statutory requirement of "full investigation" has been
met. 59 The written statement of reasons must be set forth with sufficient specificity to afford "meaningful appellate review." 0 In this
context, meaningful appellate review means that the reviewing court
should not be required to assume that adequate reasons supported
the decision to waive juvenile jurisdiction or that a "full investigation" has been made. 6' The Court believed that this result was required by reading the statute in the context of constitutional principles
relating to due process. 62
In summary, the Kent Court identified as "critically important"
any proceeding that carries the possibility of depriving the juvenile
of the statutory right to noncriminal treatment within the juvenile
system. 63 The Kent decision originally was limited in scope since the
decision seemed to be based on a statutory interpretation.6 4 Following references to Kent in In re Gault one year later, however, the
weight of authority now favors the judgment that the principles stated
in Kent are of constitutional dimension. Nevertheless, the Kent Court
did not extend constitutional protection to juvenile offenders who were
not threatened with removal from the juvenile system. This restraint
was short lived. In 1967 the United States Supreme Court declared
that the fourteenth amendment and the Bill of Rights apply to protect juveniles retained within the juvenile system who face the possibility
of incarceration in a state institution.
B.

In re Gault

In re Gault was the first case in which the United States Supreme
Court applied the fourteenth amendment and the Bill of Rights to
minors within the juvenile system. 6 Gerald Gault, age 15, had been
committed to the Arizona State Industrial School as a juvenile delinquent until he reached majority. 67 He was taken into custody without
his parents receiving notice of his arrest.6 The petition filed against
59.

Id.

60. Id.at 560.
61. Id. at 561.
62. Id. at 557.
63. Id. at 556-57.

64. S.DAvis, RIGHTS OF JUvENnas §4.2, at 4-7 (1980).
65. United States ex rel. Turner v. Rundle, 438 F.2d 839, 842 (3d Cir. 1971); Powell v.
Hocker, 453 F.2d 652, 654 (9th Cir. 1971); In re Harris, 67 Cal. 2d 876, 879, 434 P.2d 615,
617, 64 Cal. Rptr. 319, 321 (1967).
66. Gault, 387 U.S. at 12-13.
67. Id. at 7-8.
68. Id. at 5.
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him made no mention of the factual basis for the judicial action. 69
The officer who testified at the hearing stated that Gerald had admitted making a lewd telephone call."' Neither of his parents were
present when the confession was obtained nor had Gerald been informed of his right to silence." The Supreme Court held that Gerald
had been denied due process of law."' The Court stated that neither
the fourteenth amendment nor the Bill of Rights apply to adults
alone." Consequently, the Court held that the requirements of the
fourteenth amendment and the Bill of Rights apply in any proceeding
to determine whether a juvenile is a delinquent, when the outcome
of that proceeding is the possibility of commitment to a state
institution.74 The prospect of incarceration was viewed as sufficiently
critical to require certain constitutional rights to apply, including: (1)
written notice of the charges to the juvenile and his parents; (2) the
right to counsel; (3) the privilege against self-incrimination; and (4)
sworn testimony with an opportunity to cross-examine at the delinquency hearing."
Although Gault stated that a juvenile must be afforded full due
process protections at proceedings in which delinquency may be determined, the Gault rationale reaches beyond the issues involved in that
case.7 6 In the years since Gault the Supreme Court has extended the
Gault due process standard by holding that a juvenile is entitled to
the same standard of proof used in adult criminal trials." Additionally,
the double jeopardy clause prevents prosecution in criminal court after
an adjudication in juvenile court."
Gault and subsequent cases suggest that the courts should reappraise the assertion by the state of the parenspatriae doctrine to deny
minors procedural safeguards within the juvenile justice system.79 Kent
held that a proceeding that determines the important right of the
juvenile to noncriminal treatment is "critically important," and
therefore, requires procedural due process protections. 0 Read together,
69. Id.
70. Id. at 6.
71. Id. at 56.
72. See id. at 55-56.
73. Id. at 13.
74. Id. at 13, 55-56.
75. Morris v. D'Amario, 416 A.2d 137, 141 n.5 (R.I. 1980) (summary of Gault).
76. Kemplen v. State of Maryland, 428 F.2d 169, 172 (4th Cir. 1970) (citing In re Urbasek,
232 N.E.2d 716, 719 (Il. 1967) and U.S. v. Costanzo, 395 F.2d 441, 444 (4th Cir. 1968)).
77. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-68 (1970).
78. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 521 (1975).
79. Kaufman, The Child In Trouble: The Long and Difficult Road to Reforming the CrazyQuilt Juvenile Justice System, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 743, 755 (1982).
80. Kent, 383 U.S. at 556.
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Gault and Kent indicate that a proceeding that determines an important statutory right is sufficiently critical to compel procedural due
process protection, even if that proceeding does not include the
possibility that a juvenile will be transferred out of the juvenile system.
Although juvenile proceedings are protected by many of the constitutional quarantees afforded adults in criminal proceedings, the
Supreme Court and the California courts have refused to find the
rights of juveniles coextensive with those of adults.I' The parens patriae
doctrine often is relied upon as a justification for this result.8 2 As
a consequence, juveniles frequently suffer similar punishment as adult
criminals without receiving the same safeguards and constitutional
protections.1 3 As previously stated, for example, a juvenile in California
may be committed to the CYA with the mere signature of a judge
on the dispositional order.8
California law permits juvenile adjudications and dispositions" to
be made by a referee86 or by a judge of the juvenile court. 7 If a
referee orders a child removed from the home, the order must be
approved by a judge.88 That approval may be accomplished by the
signature of the judge on the disposition order:89 When the disposition
is reviewed on appeal, the record contains a probation report together
with a transcript of the adjudication hearing and the remarks of the
referee.9" The California Supreme Court, in In re John H. 9' , held
that nothing more is necessary for meaningful appellate review. 2 When
an adult is sentenced to prison, California statutes require the judge
to prepare a statement of reasons for the sentence. 93 An examination
of John H. will reveal why the California Supreme Court has rejected
a requirement that a similar statement of reasons must accompany
a disposition to commit a juvenile to the CYA.

81. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971); In re John H., 21 Cal. 3d 18,
22-23, 577 P.2d 177, 178-79, 145 Cal. Rptr. 357, 358-59 (1978).
82. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 119-40 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 40.
86. CAL. ,VELF. & INST. CODE §§247-248 (appointment, disqualification, and assignment

of referees).
87. H. THoMpsoN, CALrnoiuA

JuvENI E COURT DEsKBOOK

§5.13 (1975); telephone con-

versation with Paul DiRousso, Chief Deputy, Juvenile Court Services (Jan. 9, 1985) (notes
on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
88. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §249.
89. 21 Cal. 3d at 26, 577 P.2d at 181, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
90. Id. at 24, 577 P.2d at 180, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
91. 21 Cal. 3d 18, 577 P.2d 177, 145 Cal. Rptr. 357 (1978).
92. Id. at 21, 557 P.2d at 178, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
93. CAL. PENAL CODE §1170(c).
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CALIFoRNIA DECISIONAL LAW: In

re John H.

In In re John H. the California Supreme Court held that the United
States Constitution did not mandate a statement of reasons supporting
a disposition to the CYA. 94 Recognizing that the United States Supreme
Court in Kent found that a statement of reasons is required in a
"critically important" situation, the court, nevertheless, refused to
find that a disposition to commit a juvenile to the CYA is "critical." 95
The court distinguished Kent on the ground that Kent was removed
from the juvenile system while, in John H., the disposition to the
CYA retained the boy within the juvenile system. 96
John H. was declared a ward 97 of the court and committed to the
CYA.90 The adjudication and disposition had been made by a referee
of the juvenile court and the disposition order had been signed by
a judge. 99 The John H. court inquired whether Kent mandated a statement of reasons to satisfy the requirements of the United States
Constitution,' 0 and whether the California statutory scheme and
California Constitution required a statement of reasons to assure that
the commitment order was the decision of the judge and not the
referee.' 0 ' In rejecting these propositions, the court held that a disposition to the CYA was not sufficiently "critical" to require application
of Kent protections, 0 2 and that neither the California statutes nor
the California Constitution expressly require the judge to state reasons
for the disposition. 0 3 The court refused to require this procedure,
stating that the imposition of this requirement was properly within
the province of the legislature.'0 4 Since the California Supreme Court
has held that a disposition resulting in commitment of a juvenile to
the CYA is not a critically important proceeding' 5 and does not require
a statement of reasons for meaningful appellate review,' 06 an inquiry
into what constitutes a critically important proceeding and what is
a sufficient record for meaningful appellate review is necessary.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

21 Cal. 3d at 21, 577 P.2d at 178, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
Id. at 22-23, 577 P.2d at 178-79, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 358-59.
Id.
See supra note 5.
21 Cal. 3d at 22, 577 P.2d at 178, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
Id. at 29, 577 P.2d at 183, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 363 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
See id. at 22, 577 P.2d at 178, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
See id. at 23-27, 577 P.2d at 179-82, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 359-62.
Id. at 22-23, 577 P.2d at 178-79, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 358-59.
Id. at 23, 577 P.2d at 179, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
Id. at 25, 577 P.2d at 180, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
Id. at 22, 577 P.2d at 178, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
Cf. 383 U.S. at 561 (discussion of meaningful appellate review of a waiver order).
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A.

A "Critically Important" Proceeding

To determine whether a proceeding is "critically important," one
must understand the phrase as used in Kent.'07 In answering the question whether a child should be deprived of the special protections
of the juvenile court, the Kent Court quoted with approval from the
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia: "[I]t is implicit in
[the juvenile court] scheme that noncriminal treatment is to be the
rule-and the adult criminal treatment, the exception .... ,0 The
Court determined that Kent had a statutory right to adjudication in
the noncriminal juvenile system. °9 Any proceeding leading to the deprivation of that right was held to be critically important."'
In In re John H. the California Supreme Court specifically found
that a dispositional hearing was not critical. " ' The court distinguished
a dispositional hearing from the hearing in Kent on the ground that
Kent involved a proceeding to remove a minor from the juvenile
system, while a decision to send a child to the CYA is completely
within the juvenile justice system. 1 2 The language in Kent, however,
indicates that the definition of "critically important" turns not on
the removal of the child from the juvenile system, but on moving
the child from a protective noncriminal setting to a punitive criminal
setting." 3 The possibility of confinement in jail along with adults and
the possibility of more severe sentencing was emphasized as the main
disadvantage to which Kent was exposed by the juvenile court waiver
of jurisdiction.1'" Thus, the Court was concerned, not with the particular system in which the juvenile was incarcerated, but with the characteristics of the punishment to which he was exposed.
In California, the statutory scheme pertaining to the adjudication
and disposition of juveniles is the Juvenile Court Law.l"I The express
purpose of the Juvenile Court Law is to secure as nearly as possible
the equivalent level of care and guidance to juveniles that would normally be given by parents. ' 16 The right to noncriminal treatment
specifically is established by this statutory scheme." 7 In addition, the
107. Kent was the first case to label a juvenile court proceeding "critically important."
Id. at 560.
108. Id. at 560-61.
109. Id. at 557.
110. Id. at 556.
111. 21 Cal. 3d at 22-23, 577 P.2d at 178-79, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 358-59.
112. Id. at 22-23, 577 P.2d at 178-79, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 358-59.
113. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
114. 383 U.S. at 553-54.
115. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§200-966.
116. Id. §202 (statement of purpose).
117. Id.
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Juvenile Court Law provides that a judge can commit a juvenile to
the CYA if the judge is fully satisfied that the juvenile will benefit
from the treatment provided."18
The CYA is the most restrictive and punitive of all California
juvenile detention facilities."19 The population of the CYA is made
up of the most serious juvenile offenders in the state, as well as an
increasing number of serious offenders who are young adults. 2 ' The
increase in the young adult population at the CYA is due to recent
amendment of California Welfare and Institutions Code section 1731.5
(commonly referred to as Senate Bill 821),121 which went into effect
January 1, 1984.2' The new law, aimed at relieving overcrowding
in state adult prisons, allows a criminal court judge to sentence adult
offenders under the age of twenty-one to the Department of Correc23
tions and require the CYA to house them until age twenty-five.'
This provision has resulted in a significant increase in the CYA of
the number of older offenders sentenced for serious crimes by an adult
criminal court. In 1983, of the total 2,891 first commitments' 2 4 accepted by the CYA, 660 were referrals from criminal court. 125 In 1984,
26
1,088 of 3,216 first commitments were referrals from criminal court.
An even higher number of criminal court referrals is expected in
1985. 27' The increasing population at the CYA has resulted in a facility
where crowding and double ceiling'28 are common. 2 9 Young juveniles
often are incarcerated with older, criminally-hardened offenders in
a setting in which physical assaults, including sexual attacks frequently
occur.' 0
118. Id. §734.
119. In re Aline D., 14 Cal. 3d 557, 564, 536 P.2d 65, 68-69, 121 Cal. Rptr. 816, 820-21
(1975). The court stated that the California statutory scheme contemplates a progressively restrictive and punitive series of disposition orders including: (1) home placement; (2) foster home;
(3) local treatment facility; and as a last resort, (4) Youth Authority placement. Id.

120.
121.

1983 ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 4.
(amending CAL. WELT. &
1983 Cal. Stat. c.701, §1, at -

INST. CODE

§1731.5).

122. 1983 ANwuA. REPORT, supra note 10, at 4.
123. 1983 Cal. Stat. c. 701, §1, at (amending CAL. WELF. & INsT. CoDE §1731.5);
Sacramento Bee, January 12, 1985, at A12, col.1.
124. See generally 1983 ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 10-24 (general discussion of
first
commitments).
125. Id. at 16, table 3.
126. Telephone conversation with Max Zeigler, Chief, Data Analysis and Information Systems,
Dept. of Youth Authority (Jan. 9, 1985) (notes on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
127. Id.
128. Double ceiling is the practice of housing two inmates in a space intended for one.
Telephone conversation with Paul DiRousso, Chief Deputy, Juvenile Court Services (Jan. 9,
1985) (notes on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
129. Telephone conversation with Art German, Information Officer of the Youth Authority
(March 13, 1985) (notes on file at the PacificLaw Journal); Sacramento Bee, January 12, 1985,
at A12, col.l.
130. In re Gregory S., 85 Cal. App. 3d 206, 214, 149 Cal. Rptr. 216, 220 (1978) (Reynoso,
J., concurring).
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While the CYA prides itself on providing educational programs,' 3 ,
job training, and public service work' 32 to juveniles, these rehabilitative
programs do not outweigh the penal aspect of the CYA. The measure
of success of a rehabilitation program is the recidivism rate.' 33 The
primary goal of the CYA is to turn the youthful offender into a productive member of society.' Statistics show, however, that after offenders serve time and are released on parole, they frequently return
to their community to repeat their pattern of criminal behavior. 3' 6
In 1981, approximately 4,321 juveniles were released from the CYA.1
During the next two years, almost fifty percent violated parole and
were either recommitted to the CYA or sentenced to an adult penal
institution.'37 The conclusion seems inescapable that the CYA has failed
to achieve the rehabilitative ideal. This failure, in addition to the increase in the serious juvenile and adult offender population at the
CYA, combine to make the CYA more closely resemble an adult prison
than the place of care and guidance envisioned by the promulgators
of the California Juvenile Court Law.
In Kent, the United States Supreme Court held that the prospect
of exposing a minor to incarceration with adult criminals in a punitive
atmosphere was critically important.' 38 A proceeding in which a juvenile
could lose his right to noncriminal treatment was held sufficiently
critical to warrant application of procedural due process safeguards.',
The CYA today bears a close resemblance to the adult prison environment that the Kent Court envisioned for Kent.'4I A juvenile offender
in California has a statutory right to receive caring rehabilitative treatment when incarcerated.'' This statutory guarantee is virtually identical to the noncriminal treatment the U.S. Supreme Court found
guaranteed to Kent. 42 Just as the District of Columbia statutory
scheme provided a means for the court to deprive Kent of his right
to noncriminal treatment by transferring him out of the juvenile system,
131. See West, supra note 2, at 625.
132. See 1983 ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 5.
133.

See P. PmRsA, J. GANousIs, A. VOLENIK, H. SWANGER, & P. CONNELL, LAW AND TAC-

ncs INJuVENLE CASES §1.2 (3d ed. 1977) (juvenile institutions are criticized for failure to return
young offenders to the community).
134. West, supra note 2, at 624-25.
135. Id.
136. 1983 ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 34, table 22.
137. Id. at 34.
138. 383 U.S. at 556-57.
139. Id.
140. See supra notes 119-37 and accompanying text.
141. CAL. vELF. & INST. CODE §202.
142. Compare id. with D.C. CODE §11-1551 (Supp. IV, 1965).
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the California Juvenile Law also provides a means of depriving a juvenile offender of the right to noncriminal treatment by allowing a judge
to commit the juvenile to the CYA.4 3 The California Supreme Court,
however, has refused to find that a dispositional hearing resulting
in commitment to the CYA is critical because commitment to the CYA
does not remove the juvenile from the juvenile court system."'
This author has established that the severity of the CYA confinement
is sufficiently similar to an adult prison to render a disposition that
results in a juvenile commitment to the CYA "critically important"
within the meaning of Kent.145 The loss of the statutory right to care
and rehabilitation upon commitment to the CYA is just as critical
to a California youth as was the loss by Kent of the statutory right
to noncriminal treatment in the juvenile system of the District of
Columbia. The U.S. Supreme Court has found that juveniles do not
lose their right to due process protection simply because they are retained within the juvenile system.' 46 The Court expressly stated in Gault
that juveniles within the juvenile system have the right to certain procedural safeguards.' 47 Given the severity of the CYA and the due process requirements that apply within the juvenile system, no reason
exists to suggest that a disposition to the CYA is not a critically important proceeding deserving of the same procedural safeguards mandated by Kent. Kent held that a critically important proceeding mandated a record sufficient for "meaningful appellate review."' 48 Thus,
an examination must be made to determine what should be contained
in a record sufficient for meaningful appellate review.
B. Meaningful Appellate Review
The California Supreme Court held that the record in In re John
H. was sufficient for meaningful appellate review.' 49 John had been
adjudicated a ward of the court in a hearing before a juvenile court
referee.'50 At the dispositional hearing the referee ordered the youth
committed to the CYA.' 5 ' Since this decision involved removing the
youth from his home, the order of the referee was not effective until
143.

Compare CAL. WELF. &

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

John H., 21 Cal. 3d at 23, 577 P.2d at 179, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
See supra notes 119-43 and accompanying text.
See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id. at 21-22.
383 U.S. at 560-61.
21 Cal. 3d at 24, 577 P.2d at 180, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
Id. at 22, 577 P.2d at 178, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
Id.

INST. CODE

§734 with D.C.

CODE

§11-1553 (Supp. IV, 1965).
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approved by a juvenile court judge.'5 2 The judge gave approval by
signing a preprinted form, submitted to him by the referee, which
recited that the court had found that the minor probably would benefit
from the CYA.' 5 3 The order did not state any reasons for the disposition. In affirming the order, the California Supreme Court held that
an appellate record containing a probation report, a transcript of the
adjudication hearing, and the remarks and conclusions of the referee
were sufficient for meaningful appellate review.'1 4 The court concluded
"we think it fair to presume from the judge's approval of the order
that the judge relied upon the same or similar reasons as those..
.[of]. . .the referee."' 55 The Kent Court, however, specifically stated
that a record sufficient for meaningful appellate review must be one
from which the reviewing court was not required to make
assumptions.' 56 Kent required a statement of reasons supporting the
not need to assume
decision of the judge so the reviewing court would
5
the judge had fulfilled his statutory duty.' 1
California statutory law specifically addresses the commitment of
a juvenile to the CYA.' 5 1 When a ward is committed to the CYA,
the statute expressly requires that a judge of the court be fully satisfied
that the juvenile probably would benefit from the CYA.' 59 The statute
requires more than the mere approval of the judge; rather, the judge
is required to be fully satisfied. Implicit in the notion of full satisfaction is the idea that the judge will consider carefully the juvenile and
his crime, weigh the alternative placements, and rationally arrive at
the decision that is most beneficial for the youth. While these may
be the steps followed by a referee in determining a disposition, the
statute specifically requires the judge, not the referee, to be the one
fully satisfied.' 60 Whether the disposition originally is made by a referee
and approved by a judge or whether the disposition is made by the
judge is irrelevant. The statute describes a duty that the judge alone
is required to fulfill.
The Supreme Court in Kent stated that an appellate court should
not be required to assume a judge had fully investigated a waiver
of jurisdiction over the juvenile.' 6 ' Kent required the judge to set forth
See CAL. WELl. & INST. CODE §249.
153. 21 Cal. 3d at 29, 577 P.2d at 183, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 363 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 24, 577 P.2d at 180, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
155. Id.
152.

156.

383 U.S. at 561.

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
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the reasons for the waiver with sufficient specificity to assure the appellate court that the judge actually had fully investigated the decision
to waive juvenile jurisdiction.'6 2 When a judge in California commits
a ward to the punitive atmosphere of the CYA, an appellate court
should not be required to assume the judge is fully satisfied that the
ward will benefit from the treatment provided by the CYA. Juvenile
court judges should be required to set forth the reasons for the disposition with sufficient specificity to assure the appellate court that the
judge personally is fully satisfied that the ward will benefit from commitment to the CYA.
The California Supreme Court in John H., however, permits the
appellate court to review the disposition of a juvenile to the CYA
on a record which has been held constitutionally inadequate in similiar
circumstances. 6 3 This record, absent a statement of reasons, forces
the appellate court to assume that adequate reasons exist for the CYA
disposition and that the judge is fully satisfied that commitment to
the CYA will benefit the youth. In refusing to impose a requirement
that juvenile judges state reasons for a CYA disposition, the court
relied upon the fact that no California statute explicitly requires a
judge to specify the reasons for the disposition chosen.' 64 The court
failed to recognize that something more than a mere signature is
necessary to give effect to the statutory language requiring the judge
to be fully satisfied that the ward will benefit from commitment to
the CYA. While no statute explicitly requires a judge to prepare a
statement of reasons, this author has shown that a statement of reasons
65
implicitly is required to effectuate the juvenile law statutory scheme.'
A statement of reasons by the judge would serve as a functional guard
against cursory review and assure that the judge is fully satisfied. A
requirement of articulated reasons to support a decision to commit
a juvenile to the CYA serves numerous interests. A statement of
reasons would serve as an inherent guard against abuse of discretion
by the judge, allowing the appellate court to review the analysis used
by the judge in arriving at a decision. In addition, requiring a statement
of reasons would serve as a built-in procedural check to assure that
the substance of the statutory rights given to a juvenile by the state
of California are protected. Each of these interests now will be
examined.

162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Compare id. with 21 Cal. 3d at 24, 577 P.2d at 180, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
21 Cal. 3d at 23, 577 P.2d at 179, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
See supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
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1.

Tracing the Analysis Used by the Judge

A statement of reasons supporting commitment to the CYA will
enable an appellate court reviewing the disposition to trace and examine
the analysis used by the judge, thereby bridging the gap between a
record containing raw evidence and the final disposition. 16 Absent
articulated reasons, an appellate court is forced to search through
the record to determine which evidentiary items support the conclusions of the lower court.' 67 Juvenile judges are empowered to make
dispositions according to the indefinite "best interests of the child"
standard.'" While a case by case determination is desirable under the
parenspatriae doctrine, the U.S. Supreme Court in Kent recognized
that judicial discretion requires procedural regularity sufficient to assure
that the basic requirements of due process and fairness are satisfied.' 69
As a practical matter, the broad discretionary standard allows the
judge to use personal beliefs to make dispositional decisions.1 70 Decisions based upon personal belief or unchecked by defined criteria and
procedure pose the risk that the decisions will be arbitrary.17' The
state cannot avoid providing basic procedural protections by assum12
ing that juvenile judges always act in the best interests of the child.
Dispositional decisions have been characterized as the most important aspect of a juvenile court case. ' 7 Requiring a statement of reasons
would provide some measure of control over the discretion of the
judge. 7 A statement of reasons is an inherent guard against a careless
decision, and insures that the judge has analyzed the problem and
given full consideration to the essentials of due process and fair treatment. 17'Although a treatment or rehabilitation philosophy envisions
more dispositional discretion than a "just desserts" philosophy, judicial
supervision is called for in both instances and a statement of reasons
166. See Topanga Association for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d
506, 515-16, 522 P.2d 12, 18 , 113 Cal. Rptr. 836, 842 (1974).
167. See id. at 516, 522 P.2d at 18, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
168. Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HAv. L. REV. 1156,
1231-32 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law] (discussion of "best interests of child"

standard).
169. 383 U.S. at 553.
170. See Developments in the Law, supra note 168, at 1232.
171. Comment, Juvenile Detention Hearings:A ProposedModel Provision To Limit Discretion During The PreadjudicatoryStage, 1984 FoRDHws URB. L.J. 285, 289 n.22.
172. Kaufman, supra note 79, at 755.
173. STANDARDS RELATING TO DISPOSITIONAL PROCEEDINGS, INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JOINT JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS 3 (1980)

[hereinafter cited as

STANDARDS].

174. Id. at 53.
175. See People v. Edwards, 18 Cal. 3d 796, 804 n.10, 557 P.2d 995, 1001 n.10, 135 Cal. Rptr.
411, 417 n.10 (1976).
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would enable the appellate court to administer that supervision.' 7 6
2. Procedural Safeguard to Protect the Statutory Rights of
the Juvenile
The California Legislature has set forth specific statutory language
requiring a judge to be fully satisfiedthat a juvenile will benefit from
commitment to the CYA. 17 7 The legislature has provided that the duty
of the judge is to evaluate personally the suitability of a minor before
any commitment can be made to the CYA.178 Procedural due process
serves to protect substantive rights and assures that the rules of law
are followed accurately and consistently. 7 9 A procedure requiring the
judge to detail the specific reasons for the decision to commit a juvenile
to the CYA would assure the appellate court that the judge fulfilled
his statutory duty to give the problem his personal evaluation.
California law allows juvenile court referees to render adjudications
and dispositional decisions in much the same way as a juvenile judge. 8 '
The California Constitution, however, specifically limits the powers
of the referee to "subordinate judicial duties."'' "Subordinate judicial
duties" is not defined in the constitution nor in the statutes. Logically, however, these duties do not include any that are given expressly
to a judge by statute. 8 2 California statutes expressly state that a judge
must be fully satisfied that a juvenile will benefit from commitment
to the CYA. Clearly, this is a duty for the judge and not a subordinate
judicial duty. " To comply with the California Constitution, therefore,
a CYA disposition made by a referee must be reviewed and adopted
in a meaningful way by a juvenile court judge."' A mere signature
does not assure that the judge gave the order more than cursory review.
A signature without significant judicial review is not sufficient to make
the order of the referee equivalent to an order of a judge as statutorily
and constitutionally required. A statement of reasons by the judge,
set forth with sufficient specificity to support a CYA disposition, is
essential to assure that the power of the referee is limited to fulfilling
only subordinate judicial duties.
176.
177.

STANDARDs, supra note 173, at 53.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §734.

178. John H., 21 Cal. 3d at 33, 577 P.2d at 185, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 365 (Bird, C. J.,
dissenting).
179. L. TRBE, AimCAN CONSTITnoTNAL LAW 503 (1978).

180.

See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
CAL. CONST. art. VI, §22.
182. 21 Cal. 3d at 32-33, 577 P.2d at 185, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 365 (Bird, C. J., dissenting).
181.

183.
184.

Id.
Id.
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In summary, the John H. court held that a statement of reasons
supporting a decision to commit a juvenile to the CYA is not required
by the U.S. Constitution because a dispositional hearing resulting in
commitment to the CYA is not critical.'8I Furthermore, John H. held
that the court will not require a judge to state reasons for the decision to commit a juvenile to the CYA by judicial fiat, but will wait
until the legislature elects to enact such a requirement. 18 6 The United
States Supreme Court, however, has held that constitutional safeguards
apply in certain juvenile proceedings. These proceedings are nearly
identical in consequence to the juvenile proceedings that the California Supreme Court has held do not require constitutional safeguards.
By shifting to the legislature the burden to provide greater procedural
protection to juvenile defendants, the Justices of the California
Supreme Court are abdicating the duty to guarantee due process in
the judicial court system. The conclusion is axiomatic that due process
protections mandated by the Supreme Court must be implemented
by the California judiciary, not the legislature.
CONCLUSION

Under California law, a judge is not required to prepare an articulated statement of reasons when committing a juvenile to the CYA.' 87
A juvenile can be adjudicated delinquent at a hearing conducted by
a referee and a referee can make the dispositional decision. The only
express requirement under current California statutory and decisional
law is that a juvenile judge approve the order. 88 This presently is
accomplished by having the judge countersign the dispositional order
form prepared by the referee.
The California Supreme Court will not require a judge to state the
reasons for CYA disposition by judicial fiat, but will wait until the
legislature elects to make such a requirement.' 89 This author contends
that this duty is not that of the legislature; the duty to guarantee
due process falls upon the judiciary. The United States Supreme Court
185. Id. at 22-23, 577 P.2d at 178-79, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 358-59.
186. Id. at 25, 577 P.2d at 180, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
187. See In re Ricky H., 30 Cal. 3d 176, 184, 636 P.2d 13, 17, 178 Cal. Rptr. 324, 328 (1981).
In Ricky H., decided three years after John H., the California Supreme Court acknowledged that
the lack of a statement of reasons makes appellate review difficult and uncertain. Id. at 184, 636
P.2d at 18, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 329. The court did not hold, however, that a statement of reasons
was required. Id. In refusing to overrule John H., the court stated that "the silence of a judge
regarding his reasons for making a [CYA] commitment has never been held to violate statutory

or constitutional requirements." Id.
188.

CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §249; John H., 21 Cal. 3d at 24, 577 P.2d at 180, 145 Cal.

Rptr. at 360.
189.
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held in Gault that certain due process protections must be applied
within the juvenile system.' 9 In addition, the United States Supreme
Court held in Kent that a statement of reasons is required for "meaningful appellate review" of a "critically important" juvenile
proceeding. 19' This author has demonstrated that a dispositional hearing
resulting in commitment to the CYA is a "critically important" proceeding. The consequence to a juvenile of being committed to the
CYA is sufficiently punitive in nature to be analogous to a transfer
out of the rehabilitative juvenile system. Kent held that due process
requires a statement of reasons when a youth is transferred out of
the juvenile system. A disposition to the CYA, therefore, should be
accompanied by a statement of reasons sufficient for "meaningful
appellate review." The lack of specifically stated reasons supporting
a decision to commit a juvenile to the CYA is a violation of the due
process rights of the minor involved. In addition, California statutes
and the California Constitution require the judge to do more than
give cursory review to a CYA dispositional order. An express statement of reasons by the judge assures the appellate court that the judge
fulfilled this requirement. The U.S. Constitution, supported by the
Californa statutes and the California Constitution, requires a judge
to issue a statement of reasons to ensure that due process is afforded
a juvenile subject to a "critically important" CYA disposition.
Susie James Kater
190.
191.

See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
383 U.S. at 560-61.
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